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 Using panel estimates of the widest possible country sample, for the longest period 
possible, we document for the first time the impact of consolidations on labour market 
participation by gender. We find that females’ employment response to expenditure-based 
adjustments is less expansionary than males’ one and that revenue-based consolidations are 
more harmful to males than to females, regardless of the discrimination level. When 
discrimination is low, the effects on females’ employment is qualitatively similar to males’ one, 
although quantitatively more elastic for males. In economies with high gender inequalities, tax-
based consolidations are less recessionary to employment and expenditure-based adjustments 
are less expansionary than in a more egalitarian world. 
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 Government and public authorities often use fiscal adjustments and structural programs 
to balance the budget deficit in order to address economic and social unbalances. Policymakers 
must be aware of gender specific constraints that may influence the impacts of fiscal 
adjustments, delivering undesirable economic implications. The main purpose of this paper is, 
for the first time, to inform policymakers about these diversified effects, helping them to 
improve the design of the programs to be implemented.  
 The short-term effects of fiscal adjustments on output have been on the center of the 
discussion among authors in the last decades. Guajardo, Leigh and Pescatori (2014), Alesina et 
al. (2017) and Alesina, Favero and Giavazzi (2012) conclude similarly that tax-based 
adjustments are more harmful to output than expenditure-based consolidations. This paper 
moves into a novel approach, aiming to examine how and in which direction pre-existing gender 
inequality conditions determine the impact of fiscal adjustments by gender. Alesina, Ichino and 
Karabarbounis (2011) document that, historically, the women’s wage elasticity of labor supply 
tends to be higher, leading them to present lower participation rates than men. Plus, the authors 
argue that home chores are unequally distributed across genders, usually favouring men. As a 
consequence, males perform less home duties, devoting more time to market work (Burda, 
Hamermesh and Weil, 2007). As so, the aforementioned arguments may guide the impacts of 
fiscal consolidations across genders. Trough panel estimates we find that revenue-based 
consolidations are harmful to employment rate, whereas expenditure-based consolidations 
increase employment, whatever the gender considered. In contrast to Alesina, Ichino and 
Karabarbounis (2011) our estimates point that males are relatively more squeezed out of the 
market during tax-based consolidations than females. When discrimination level is low, the 
effects of adjustments on females’ employment is qualitatively similar to males’ one, although 
quantitatively more elastic for men. On the opposite, when discrimination is high, the impacts 
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across gender become qualitatively and quantitatively similar. Moreover, high discrimination 
leads females to abandon more the market when facing expenditure-based consolidations. In 
general, males’ employment reacts more to expenditure-based consolidation than females’ one, 
corroborating the role of women as caretakers of the entire family.  
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reports some pertinent 
literature on this theme. Section 3 describes the data to be used, defines fiscal consolidation 
episodes as well as revenue and expenditure-based adjustments. Section 4 defines the 
methodology and the econometric specification. Section 5 discusses the results on fiscal 
consolidations and gender inequality and its robustness. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2 Literature Review 
 The literature on the gender gap in the labor market is relatively recent. It suggests that 
men and women present different elasticities of labour supply. Females’ one tends to be higher, 
with women performing more home duties and less market work (Alesina, Ichino and 
Karabarbounis, 2011). An analysis covering OCDE countries detects the same discrepancy 
between genders, when it comes to market or household duties, adding that women’s market 
hours resemble more the economic cycle fluctuations than men’s one (Burda, Hamermesh and 
Weil, 2007). The higher elasticity of labour supply of women means they are more sensible to 
changes on wages, abandoning the labour market easily when responding to negative shocks.  
 Different reasons are pointed out to justify the discrepancies in labour supply elasticities 
across genders. Alesina, Ichino and Karabarbounis (2011) explain it through a bargaining 
process between spouses which would affect the distribution of market, home goods and time 
spent in each sector. Labor supply would arise endogenously from the internal organization of 
the family, with men possessing a higher bargaining power in the couple decision of allocating 
time, possibly due to the importance that physical characteristics assumed to our ancestors. The 
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authors also argue that the individual who could find more substitutes to market work will have 
a higher elasticity of labor supply, finding at the same time that women present a comparative 
advantage in dedicating time to home duties, either because they are more productive in that 
sector, or due to pure discrimination - men are often offered higher wages. Men also tend to 
commit to higher wage careers, mainly due to differences in preferences between genders 
(Zafar, 2013). Burda, Hamermesh and Weil (2007) confirm that men’s higher wages lead them 
to perform less home chores and to work more in the market (and in total). As women perform 
more tiring activities in home than men, the females’ work effort in the market is reduced, 
leading married women to earn less (hourly) than married men, even when there are no 
differences in human capital between genders (Becker, 1985). Plus, in the past, when there were 
no substitutes to home duties, such as washing machines and vacuum cleaners, women had to 
devote more time to these chores. When these types of products were released, their devotion 
to market hours increased, as home care became “automatized” (Greenwood, Seshadri and 
Yorukoglu, 2005).  
 Technological and cultural changes within the family chore changed the historically 
course of women’s elasticity of labour supply (Alesina, Ichino and Karabarbounis, 2011). 
Specifically, progresses in the medical sector, such as breast milk substitutes and improvements 
in the obstetrician field, enabled females to increase their participation in the market (Albanesi 
and Olivetti, 2007). Females’ labour supply elasticity has been decreasing for the past 30 years, 
as women started to perceive employment as long term careers rather than a simple job (Goldin, 
2006). Empirically, Blau and Kahn, (2007), found that women have a higher ratio of home 
duties over market work than men, although the gap has been decreasing in the last decades. 
 In order to balance the budget, fiscal adjustments may be based on revenue increases or 
on expenditure cuts. Most importantly, the question relies on which specific components are 
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managed when government choose one of the two sides. Using the concept of “fiscal impulse”5 
to measure fiscal adjustments (or expansions) one identifies that, the majority of fiscal 
adjustments are made on the revenues side, through increases in taxes, particularly direct and 
indirect taxes on households. Direct taxes on businesses and social security contributions rank 
second in government priorities. Adjustments based on expenditure cuts are less frequent. On 
the expenditure side the components which are managed more frequently are public investment, 
transfers and government wages. Government non-wage consumption and subsidies do not 
emerge as first option to policymakers (Alesina et al., 1995). The composition of the adjustment 
and particularly the components manipulated becomes crucial to determine its success. 
Successful adjustments are mostly made on the expenditure side (about 80%), while 
adjustments made on revenue side fail more frequently (Alesina et al., 1995).   
 The effect of fiscal adjustments on output is relatively consensual among authors. 
Guajardo, Leigh and Pescatori, (2014) uses a new disruptive method6 to identify fiscal 
adjustments, concluding that consolidations have contractionary effects on output in the short-
term, persisting up to five years. Moreover, the consolidations based on tax hikes are found to 
be more harmful for output than the ones based on expenditure cuts. Alesina et al. (2017) entails 
on a more exhaustive analysis, decomposing expenditure into transfers and government 
spending, but yielding the same conclusion. The author also documents that tax hikes conducts 
to deeper and longer recessions than spending cuts. Alesina, Favero and Giavazzi (2012) 
conclude similarly to the previous authors, but adding that sometimes, expenditure-based 
consolidations may even not generate a recession. Brinca et al., (2017) unveils that inequality 
extent the recessive effect of fiscal adjustments. Economies with higher income inequality will 
 
5 The fiscal impulse is computed using the “unemployment adjusted primary deficit”. Any cyclical components 
or irrelevant discretionary fluctuations are disregarded, focusing only on government actions that influence fiscal 
policy. During the period 1960-1992 the authors identified 121 small and 66 strong adjustments in 20 OECD 
countries. 
6 In opposition to the CAPB, the authors use historical policy reports to identify only discretionary changes in 
fiscal policy, similar to what Romer and Romer, (2010) did in its work. 
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face higher recessive impacts on output when facing a fiscal adjustment, due to a more 
prominent labour supply decrease. An empirically analysis of the German (low wage 
inequality) and Czech Republic (high wage inequality) economies corroborate the results, with 
lower output losses in Germany. 
 Finally, it is relevant for this paper to highlight the impact of fiscal adjustments in the 
labour market. Consolidations driven by labour tax hikes increase the level of unemployment 
rate (Nickell, 1997). Agnello et al. (2014) confirms these results, adding that the duration and 
the size of the tax-based fiscal adjustment expand the impact on the total unemployment rate, 
while expenditure-based consolidation do not produce significant effect on unemployment. 
Bova, Kolerus and Tapsoba (2015) use the Okun’s coefficient7 to measure the impact of fiscal 
consolidations on employment. They empirically find that fiscal adjustments impact positively 
the coefficient, meaning that employment becomes more reactive to output. Therefore, an 
output contraction (due to a fiscal adjustment) leads unemployment to increase when compared 
to normal times. Further investigation deduce that the Okun’s coefficient only reacts to 
expenditure-based adjustments and are unresponsive to tax increases.  
 
3 Data 
 Aiming to determine and measure how fiscal consolidations and its type – tax-based or 
expenditure-based - impacts the contemporary change in output and employment by gender, 
we propose to run panel estimates of the widest possible country sample, for the longest period 
possible. To consult the initial countries for which data was collected please check Exhibit 1 
in the appendix. At an early stage, the real Gross Domestic Product growth (GDPgrowth) will 
compose the left-hand side of the panel regressions, while the right side will incorporate the 
 
7 The Okun’s coefficient measures the response of employment to changes in output. The coefficient may 
depend on institutions, labor market rigidities, costs created by employments protection laws or technological 
and training costs. The coefficient depends on each country features, varying accordingly.   
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dummy variables that identify fiscal consolidations and its type (Consolidation and 
Expenditure-based). Additionally, the usual controls as real GDP per capita (GDPpc) in local 
currency units (LCU), trade as a percentage of GDP (TradeGDP), investment as a percentage 
of GDP (InvGDP), the gross secondary enrolment (GrossSecEnr), political stability index 
(PolStab), the Gini index (GINI) and population (Pop) will be amassed as in (Tavares and 
Wacziarg, 2001). Although the time period for which data was collected covers the range 1982-
2018, some variables such as GrossSecEnr, GINI and PolStab are not available for long period 
of times in some countries. Hence, this limited the number of observations. 
 Afterwards, we move to the impact of consolidations and its type on labour participation 
variables by gender. The dependent variables will be female and male employment as a 
percentage of the respective gender population over 15 years old (femEmp and maleEmp). Apart 
from the consolidation dummy variables, the covariates will incorporate the dependent variable 
lagged and the real GDP per capita. Male to female employment ratio (mfEmpRatio) and male 
to female labour force participation ratio (mfLFPRatio) will further be used as discrimination 
criteria. Finally, using the same procedure, we analyze the consolidation effects on employment 
by sector, where the female and male employment as a percentage of the respective gender 
employment in agriculture (femEmpAgr and maleEmpAgr), industry (femEmpInd and 
maleEmpInd) and services (femEmpSer and maleEmpSer) will operate as dependent variables. 
 Although its different reliable original sources, all variables were directly gathered from 
the World Bank DataBank database, reinforcing the adequacy of the data and facilitating its 
processing. The majority of the variables are expressed in a 0-100 scale. The exceptions are the 
male to female ratios, measured in a 0-1 scale, the dummy variables identifying consolidation 
episodes, taking the values 0 or 1, Political Stability ranging from -2.5 to 2.5 and real GDP per 




3.1  Definition of Fiscal Consolidation Episodes 
 As the focus is on discretionary fiscal policies, the cyclical adjusted primary balance 
(CAPB) as a percentage of GDP will be used to define consolidation episodes once it corrects 
the budget balance from the impact of changes in some variables, namely inflation or real 
interest rates (Afonso, 2010). Furthermore, this measure is frequently used in the literature and 
by international organizations.  
 The CAPB (current LCU) is accessible in the World Economic Outlook (2019) from 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). However, as it is only available for recent years, it 
limits the time range of our analysis. Further, it was divided by the GDP in current LCU 
(nomGDP) to obtain the CAPB as a percentage of GDP. Again, both variables were collected 
from the WorldBank DataBank dataset. To identify fiscal consolidation episodes, thresholds 
will be set, regarding changes in CAPB as a percentage of GDP over the years. The following 
table highlights the definitions which were tested to obtain the most reliable measure of fiscal 
consolidation. 
Table 1 – Definitions of fiscal consolidations. 
Criteria Source 
“The change in CAPB is at least 1.5 p.p. of GDP in 1 year.” (Alesina et al., 1995) 
“The change in CAPB is at least 2 p.p. of GDP in 1 year or at least 1.5 
p.p. of GDP per year in both 2 consecutive years.” 
(Alesina and Ardagna, 1998) 
“The cumulative change in CAPB is at least 5, 4, 3 p.p. of GDP in 
respectively 4, 3, or 2 consecutive years, or 3 p.p. in 1 year.” 
(Giavazzi and Pagano, 1996) 
 Despite the use of all definitions to evaluate the impacts on output, we will focus on 
Alesina and Ardagna (1998) criteria, once it is the most recent one and identifies an empirical 





3.2   Definition of Expenditure and Revenue-Based Fiscal Consolidations  
 Relevant literature on fiscal consolidation episodes, as (Beetsma, Furtuna and 
Giuliodori, 2018), use a 50% threshold to classify the adjustment composition, setting that if 
more than 50% of the variation of the variable that identifies fiscal adjustment episodes comes 
from expenditures it will be classified as an expenditure-based consolidation. If the opposite is 
true, meaning that more than 50% of the variation comes from the revenues, the consolidation 
episode will be declared as tax-based. To access this, a dummy variable is constructed similarly 
to (Afonso and Jalles, 2012). Thus, a expenditure-based consolidation is determined as follows: 
Expenditure-based = {
1, 𝑖𝑓 ∆𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑚𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑡/Δ𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐵𝑖,𝑡 > 0.5 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 =  1
                                                                                                                    ,
 0,                                                                                         𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒.
 
where PrimExp (current LCU) represents the government expenditures excluding interest 
payments. It was obtained by subtracting the interest payments in current LCU (i) to the 
government expenditures in current LCU (Exp). So, an expenditure-based consolidation is 
identified whenever the first differences of primary expenditures over the first difference of 
CAPB is higher than 50%, given a consolidation episode. Table 2 depicts the number of 
consolidations identified by each criteria. 
     Table 2 – Number of consolidation episodes. 
Criteria Expenditure-based Tax-based All 
(Alesina et al., 1995) 83 200 283 
(Alesina and Ardagna, 1998) 47 151 198 
(Giavazzi and Pagano, 1996) 43 151 194 
 The numbers displayed are in accordance with (Alesina et al., 1995), which documents 





3.3   Other Data Considerations 
 To eliminate possible outliers from the data, each variable descriptive statistics and 
frequency histograms were carefully analyzed in order to detect unusual values. The 
econometric analysis may also help to mitigate outsiders due to the high number of countries 
and years. All in all, the results will not be undermined. 
 Although the CAPB is widely used in literature, it has been recently criticized due to 
the overidentification of fiscal contractionary episodes. Two main reasons are pointed out. First, 
the CAPB rises during “stock market booms” due to increases in capital gains and tax revenues. 
Second, sometimes authorities may increase taxes or reduce expenses to prevent the 
overheating of the economy. These attempts may be wrongly classified as fiscal consolidations. 
For a more exhaustive analysis we recommend for further investigations to exploit the 
“narrative approach”, where historical reports are used to identify consolidation episodes 
(Guajardo, Leigh and Pescatori, 2014). 
 Due to robustness concerns, other variables will be exploited later on this report. Female 
unemployment as a percentage of female labour force (femUne) and male unemployment as a 
percentage of male labour force (maleUne) will be tested alternatively to femEmp and maleEmp 
to capture the sensitiveness of the effects of consolidations on gender labour market 
participation. The variables mentioned above were also collected from de DataBank database. 
 
4 Methodology and Econometric Specification  
 As primary task, the impact of fiscal consolidations - as a whole and discriminated by 
tax or expenditure-based - on output growth will be examined through the following fixed-
effects panel model: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛿𝑭𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽𝑿𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜆𝑡 +  𝜇𝑖,𝑡 (1) 
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where 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 stands for real GDP growth for country i = 1,2,3…N in year t = 1,2,3…T. 𝑿𝑖,𝑡−1 is a 
vector of control variables that includes the natural logarithms of GDPpc and Pop, TradeGDP, 
InvGDP, GrossSecEnr, PolStab and GINI. All the controls are lagged to capture the delayed 
effect on output. The variables in logarithm aim to ease its interpretation and to deal with scale 
concerns. The vector 𝑭𝑖,𝑡 comprises the dummy variables identifying fiscal consolidation 
episodes as defined in section 3.1 and section 3.2. The term 𝜆𝑡 denotes the year fixed-effects 
whereas 𝜇𝑖,𝑡 represents the error term. The panel regression comprises cluster standard errors 
to account for heteroskedasticity and correlation in individual (countries) errors. 
 This stage aims to gather conclusions on the effect of consolidations, corroborating the 
empirical findings specified in the literature review. If so, it will reinforce the adequacy of the 
data to test further predictions on gender inequalities and fiscal consolidations, which is the 
purpose of this paper. 
 Phase two of the report focus on the effects of fiscal adjustments on gender labour 
market participation. To test this impact, we use a dynamic panel model of the form: 
𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜃𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝑭𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛾𝑙_𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝑖,𝑡  
where 𝐸𝑖,𝑡 will be either female and male employments rates (femEmp and maleEmp, 
respectively) and further female and male employment rates regarding the activity sector 
(femEmpAgr, maleEmpAgr, femEmpInd, maleEmpInd, femEmpSer and maleEmpSer, 
respectively) for country i = 1,2,3…N in year t = 1,2,3…T. 𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 accounts for the lagged 
dependent variable, 𝑭𝑖,𝑡 is the vector identifying fiscal adjustment episodes, and 𝑙_𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑖,𝑡−1 
is the lagged natural logarithm of real GDP per capita. 𝜇𝑖,𝑡 is the error term.  
 The dynamic model is estimated using a one-step system GMM estimator as in 
(Blundell and Bond, 1998) to account for the persistence of employment over time, the 




contemporaneous realisations of the error term, unobserved heterogeneity, heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation within individual errors. The option “small” was added to get the variance 
correction for finite samples (Windmeijer, 2005). Two types of instruments were used. The 
“GMM-style”, built on the Arellano-Bond logic of using lags of dependent variable, was 
restricted up to lag number 4, to deal with possible loss of efficiency due to the huge number 
of instruments (Roodman, 2009). In the “IV-style” were included the time effects. The “system” 
GMM estimator provide substantial advantages when compared to the “difference” GMM 
estimator, which is known to be a possible biased estimator, mainly when in presence of high 
persistence of the series (Blundell and Bond, 1998). Even so, due to robustness concerns both 
estimators were tested. Both performed good regarding consistency and delivered quite similar 
coefficient’s signs and values. 
 The effects of consolidation episodes on employment will be tested with no restrictions 
first, and then using the median values of the male to female ratios specified in section 3, aiming 
to split the sample between high and low values of gender inequality conditions. 
 
5 Results 
5.1   Baseline 
 The results regarding the impact of fiscal consolidations on output growth are presented 
in Table 3. Columns 2, 3 and 4 depict the impact of consolidations as a whole, whereas columns 
5, 6 and 7 illustrate the impact of tax-based and expenditure-based consolidations. All the 
definitions listed on Table 1 perform qualitatively similarly. As previously explained, only 
coefficients regarding Alesina and Ardagna (1998) criteria to identify fiscal consolidation 
episodes will be interpreted. Regarding consolidation episodes as a whole (column 3), the signs  
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 Table 3 – Effects of fiscal consolidations on output. 
Notes: The criterion are the ones from Table 1. All models are estimated with a constant and year fixed-effects. Robust t-
statistics are presented in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.  
of the usual controls corroborate previous literature on this subject. The exceptions are the Gini 
coefficient, investment as a percentage of GDP and gross secondary enrolment rate. 
Nevertheless, they are not statistically significant. In fact, the only statistically significant 
controls are trade as a percentage of GDP and the natural logarithms of real GDP per capita and 
population. The variable of interest, Consolidation, delivers a significant negative short-term 
impact on output, decreasing GDP growth by 1.96 p.p., as in accordance with previous 
literature. The output fall is caused by a labor supply decrease. When the adjustment is made 
through cuts in government spending, as debt decreases, wages increase, leading economic 
agents to expect higher future income. Agents decrease their labor supply as they anticipate 
higher earnings, leading output to drop in the short run. When the adjustment is made through 
tax hikes, the latter effect is combined with a substitution effect, as wages are more taxed. 
Similarly, labor supply drives output to fall (Brinca et al., 2017).  
Dependent 
variable 



































































































































Observations 705 690 681 607 597 590 
No. Countries 74 73 73 65 65 65 
R2 (within) 0.497 0.500 0.479 0.528 0.527 0.504 
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 More interesting is the decomposed effect of consolidations. Now, compared with the 
previous case, the GINI coefficient sign is in line with the economic theory (column 6). One 
depicts that the negative impact on output comes from tax-based adjustments. Once 
Expenditure-based is a dummy variable which assumes value 1 if the fiscal adjustment is done 
through the expenditures side, its coefficient will capture the difference between expenditure-
based consolidations and the remaining episodes. Thus, the tax-based effect is now measured 
by the coefficient of Consolidation. As argued by Alesina et al., (2017) and Guajardo, Leigh 
and Pescatori, (2014), we also state that tax-based consolidations damage more output than 
expenditure-based ones. Tax-based consolidation episodes induce a decrease in the real GDP 
growth of 2.546 p.p.. The difference from an expenditure-based consolidation to any other 
episode is 1.592 p.p., given by the coefficient of Expenditure-based. As so, expenditure-based 
consolidations are prone to boost short-term output growth, as in accordance with Alesina, 
Favero and Giavazzi (2012). 
 As the main goal of the work project is to capture for the first time the relationships 
between fiscal adjustments and gender inequalities, several specifications were carried out. 
First, the impacts of consolidations on labour market participation by gender were tested. Table 
4 displays the results. The employment process is quite similar across genders, as it is illustrated 
by the resemblance of the significant coefficients of the lagged value of employment rate. The 
effects on female and male employment corroborate the GDP movements during consolidation 
episodes, either they are made on the revenue or expenditure side.   
 Tax-based consolidations shrink employment in both cases, suggesting that the 
substitution effect more than compensates the income effect. The impact on males is more 
pronounced than in females, with employment rate decreasing 0.906 p.p. and 2.585 p.p., 
respectively. Both coefficients are statistically significant. Despite the literature pointing higher 
elasticity of labour supply for women as in (Alesina, Ichino and Karabarbounis, 2011), we find  
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Table 4 - Effects of consolidations on female and male employment. 
Notes: All models are estimated using the one-step system GMM estimator as in (Blundell and Bond, 1998). The p-values for 
the tests of first and second-order autocorrelation are given by AR (1) and AR (2), respectively. The Sargan test presents the 
p-values for the over-identifying restrictions. Robust t-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, 
 *p < 0.1.  
that men present more elastic responses to tax-based consolidations. Some factors may justify 
these findings. First, under the data constraints (regarding the time range) that we face in our 
estimates, the females’ labour elasticity is not as big as it would be in a different scenario, once 
it has been decreasing for the past few years. Also, males commit more to higher wage careers 
than females (Zafar, 2013) and this commitment is less elastic to changes in taxes (Alesina, 
Ichino and Karabarbounis, 2011). Under discretionary taxes, men wages will be more affected 
as their earnings are in general higher, enlarging the substitution effect. Besides, men’s higher 
wages induces a higher demand for leisure due to income effects in preferences (Ohanian, 
2013). Thus, the higher demand for leisure may also reinforce the labour market exit.  
 Expenditure-based consolidations increase males’ employment rate more than females’ 
one. The difference from the impact of a expenditure-based consolidation to any other episode 
in the female employment rate is 1.414 p.p. whereas in the male’s case is 3.461 p.p.. The impact 
for males is almost twice as large as the impact for females. The lower significant impact on 
female employment corroborates the role of expenditure substitutes that women undertake. As 
Dependent variable 
Female employment 
(% of female population) 
Male employment 
(% of male population) 




































Observations 1604 1229 1604 1229 
No. Countries 81 73 81 73 
AR (1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR (2) 0.972 0.616 0.011 0.144 
Sargan test 0.938 0.990 0.980 0.992 
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in the past 30 years transfers became the more relevant component of government expenses 
(Alesina et al., 1995), a cut in government spending will affect more the substitutes of this type 
of expenditure. As females assume the leading role in home chores, childcare or health care, 
they will be more harmed than men, hence moving less into the labour market. 
 The pre-existing gender inequality conditions may change the previous results. We test 
in what direction high or low values of discrimination affect the impacts of consolidations on 
female and male employment rates. To access it, our sample was restricted, using thresholds on 
variables denoting market participation discrimination such as the male to female employment 
ratio and the male to female labour force participation ratio. As some female indicators assume 
significant low values, particularly in developing countries, the ratios will exhibit high 
averages, causing the sample above the average to present few observations. In order to get a 
decent number of observations below and above the threshold we use the median instead. Table 
5 portrays this scenario. If above the median, we are in presence of high female discrimination. 
When the opposite happens, females are not (or at least less) discriminated. 





 The impacts on female and male employment rates given the discrimination level are 
presented in Table 6. As before, the employment processes remain stable across genders, 
whatever the level of discrimination considered. As one can observe, even using the median as 
threshold, the sub-samples regarding high discrimination level do not present significant 
coefficients for consolidation episodes in the females’ case. The first important conclusion 
regarding female results is that when discrimination is low (columns 3, 5) the impact of tax- 
 Male to female ratio 
Discrimination criteria Employment Labour Force Participation 
Observations 4628 4785 
Average 1.727 1.638 





    Table 6 - Effects of tax-based and expenditure-based consolidations given the discrimination level. 
Notes: All models are estimated using the one-step system GMM estimator as in (Blundell and Bond, 1998). The p-values for the tests of first and second-order autocorrelation are given by AR 
(1) and AR (2), respectively. The Sargan test presents the p-values for the over-identifying restrictions. Robust t-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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Observations 529 700 472 757  529 700 472 757 
No. Countries 45 46 39 48  45 46 39 48 
AR (1) 0.020 0.000 0.023 0.000  0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 
AR (2) 0.350 0.880 0.406 0.932  0.324 0.279 0.375 0.218 
Sargan test 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
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based consolidations becomes higher. Given low employment discrimination, a tax-based 
episode decreases female employment rate by 1.588 p.p., on average. When male to female 
employment ratio is below the median, males and females have a relatively similar presence in 
the market. As females engage more in market, they react more. When male to female labour 
force participation ratio is used to set the discrimination level the results are qualitatively similar 
to the one’s commented above, although slightly quantitatively different in some cases. As data 
for labour force participation by gender is more demanding than data for the employment rate, 
it becomes relatively harder to measure it in developing countries. That is why we use 
employment rate as dependent variable in this work project. 
 Regarding males' employment rate (columns 6, 7, 8 and 9), the higher the female 
discrimination, the lower are the impacts either of tax or expenditure-based consolidations. As 
men are more in the market, with a strengthened position relatively to women, the combination 
between the substitution and the income effect delivers lower impacts of tax-based adjustments, 
as women are not an alternative source of income. During expenditure-based episodes men 
enter less in the market when male to female ratios are higher. This outcome is particularly 
expected, as the already high presence of males in the market blocks the entrance.  
 As a general point, one can observe that when discrimination is high, the response of 
employment is less contractionary to the effects of tax-based consolidations and less 
expansionary when facing expenditure-based consolidation. Moreover, when discrimination is 
low, the impact of consolidations on female employment rate is qualitatively similar to the 
impact on male employment rate, although quantitatively less elastic, either the consolidation 
is tax or expenditure-based.  
 Finally, we study the impact of consolidations on female and male employment rates by 
sector of activity. By now, we found that typically, the response of males’ employment rates to 
consolidations, either revenue or expenditure-based, are more elastic than the response of 
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females’ employment rates. As expenditure-based adjustments mostly affect the public sector, 
it must be in the private sector that male employment increases the most. Descriptive statistics 
on employment by sector and gender are presented in Table 7. The content is in accordance 
with Zafar, (2013), who states that men major often in technical programs, such as engineering, 
whereas women pursue areas such as education. This leads females to be mostly employed in 
the services sector and males in the industrial sector.  
Table 7 – Descriptive statistics of male and female employment by sector. 
 Table 8 displays the impacts of consolidations on employment by sector. An 
expenditure-based consolidation is particularly onerous to the services sector, either to women 
or men. Both genders move out from this sector when spending cuts are carried out. Some of 
the individuals will move to a different sector, as expenditure-based consolidations increase 
employment in the agricultural and in the industrial sector. The ones who can not find a job in 
any of the other sectors will be forced to exit the labour market. As the overall employment 
rate, whatever the gender considered, increases during expenditure-based adjustments (see 
Table 4) one can state that most of the employees move to a different sector. 
  Note that most of the public institutions belong to the services sector. As females have 
a considerable high presence in this sector relatively to men, a higher number of women is 
moving out from this sector. Regarding the industrial sector, not only men’s employment rates 
increase more when facing spending cuts (1.419 p.p. for males against 1.062 p.p. for females) 
as their presence in this sector almost doubles the presence of female employees. Due to the 
high specialization of males in the industrial field it is easier for them to move from the services  
 Female sector employment 
(% of female employment) 
 Male sector employment  
(% of male employment) 
Sector Agriculture Industry Services  Agriculture Industry Services 
Observations 4620 4620 4620  4620 4620 4620 
Average (%) 30.027 12.813 57.160  31.272 24.434 44.293 
Min (%) 0.011 0.199 1.601  0.089 2.230 5.278 
Max (%) 96.854 66.58 98.669  92.485 67.628 84.574 
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Table 8 - Effects of tax-based and expenditure-based consolidation on male and female employment 
by sector. 
Notes: All models are estimated using the one-step system GMM estimator as in (Blundell and Bond, 1998). The p-values for 
the tests of first and second-order autocorrelation are given by AR (1) and AR (2), respectively. The Sargan test presents the 
p-values for the over-identifying restrictions. Robust t-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, 
*p < 0.1.  
to the industrial sector when their jobs are affected by government spending cuts. 
 Regarding tax-based consolidation it is also on the industrial sector than we perceive a 
significant difference between the impact on males and females’ employment rates (-407 p.p. 
for males and -1.240 p.p. for females). The males’ response is clearly more elastic in this sector, 
suggesting than men abandon significantly more the industrial sector during revenue-based 
adjustment than females. During tax-hikes, men move primarily to the agriculture sector 
whereas women opt by the services sector, due to the higher expertise of the latter in this area. 
Nevertheless, as the overall impact of tax-based adjustment leads employment rate to fall for 
both genders, we state that during these episodes most individuals are actually exiting the labour 
market instead of moving among sectors. Thus, it becomes clear that the differences in inflows 
and outflows to the market, when facing expenditure-based or tax-based consolidations, 
respectively, is more pronounced in males’ case and is mainly driven by the industrial sector. 
 As a final note one should not neglect the second order correlation of the errors when 
Dependent variable Female sector employment 
(% of female employment) 
 Male sector employment  
(% of male employment) 




































































Observations 1229 1229 1229  1229 1229 1229 
No. Countries 73 73 73  73 73 73 
AR (1) 0.002 0.000 0.000  0.001 0.000 0.000 
AR (2) 0.393 0.062 0.347  0.023 0.005 0.024 
Sargan test 0.996 0.990 0.989  0.990 0.984 0.988 
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male employment rate by sector is used as dependent variable. Although it is not the case along 
the paper, one may alert for some consistency concerns. 
 
5.2   Robustness and Sensitivity 
 In this section we investigate the robustness of the results, testing if consolidation 
episodes deliver similar impacts on an alternative dependent variable - unemployment rate as a 
percentage of labour force. As labour force includes only people who are actually working or 
actively looking for a job, we expect more significant and active responses to consolidations 
episodes, as the economically inactive population, such as students or pensioners are not taken 
into account. The results regarding the overall impact of tax-based and expenditure-based 
consolidations on unemployment rates are depicted in Table 9.  
Table 9 - Effects of tax-based and expenditure-based consolidations on unemployment across genders. 
Notes: All models are estimated using the one-step system GMM estimator as in (Blundell and Bond, 1998). The p-values for 
the tests of first and second-order autocorrelation are given by AR (1) and AR (2), respectively. The Sargan test presents the 
p-values for the over-identifying restrictions. Robust t-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05,  
*p < 0.1.  
 As predicted, the impacts of tax-based and expenditure-based consolidations are now 
more significant and in general more pronounced. More important, the results are in line with 
when employment to population rates are used. Tax-based consolidations increase relatively 
Dependent variable 
Female unemployment 
(% of Labour Force) 
Male unemployment 
(% of Labour Force) 




















Observations 1229 1229 
No. Countries 73 73 
AR (1) 0.000 0.000 
AR (2) 0.326 0.020 
Sargan test 0.981 0.989 
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more male unemployment, whereas spending cuts present lower impacts on female 
unemployment rate. 
 The impacts of consolidation episodes on unemployment rates using male to female 
ratios to access the discrimination level are presented in Table 10. Now, females’ 
unemployment response to consolidations episodes is qualitatively and qualitatively similar to 
men’s one, whatever the discrimination context. Still, despite the minimal differences, men 
abandon more the market during tax-based episodes than females and enter more in the market 
during expenditure-based ones. 
 Now it is possible to access the response of females’ unemployment when the 
discrimination level is high. Note that in Table 4 female employment rate did not budge. Now, 
high inequality promotes less elastic responses of female unemployment rate to expenditure-
based consolidations, meaning that women are retreating more from the labour market when 
discrimination is high. As argued by Alesina, Ichino and Karabarbounis (2011), in high 
discrimination countries, the unequal distribution of chores at home becomes even more 
unbalanced across genders, forcing women to abandon relatively more the  market to offset the 
loss of benefits that the couple faces when government reduces expenditures.  
 
6 Conclusion 
 Public authorities may use fiscal consolidations to balance the budget. Depending 
whether they choose to increase taxes or cut expenses, they must be aware that this decision 
will trigger different economic implications, namely on labour market participation by gender, 
as males and females respond differently to revenue-based or expenditure-based consolidations. 
 Through panel estimates we confirm that tax-based consolidations are more harmful to 
output than expenditure-based ones. Thereafter, we move to a novel approach, documenting 






Table 10 - Effects of tax-based and spend-based consolidations given discrimination thresholds on female and male unemployment. 
Notes: All models are estimated using the one-step system GMM estimator as in (Blundell and Bond, 1998). The p-values for the tests of first and second-order autocorrelation are given by AR 
(1) and AR (2), respectively. The Sargan test presents the p-values for the over-identifying restrictions. Robust t-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.  
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Observations 529 700 472 757  529 700 472 757 
No. Countries 45 46 39 48  45 46 39 48 
AR (1) 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 
AR (2) 0.098 0.874 0.020 0.387  0.233 0.046 0.223 0.016 
Sargan test 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
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shrink employment and that expenditure-based consolidations increase it, whatever the gender 
considered. In contrast with previous literature, our estimates point higher impacts of revenue-
based consolidations for males than for females. In presence of low female discrimination, the 
impact of consolidations on females’ employment rate is qualitatively similar to the impact on 
males’ one. Still, men’s response is quantitatively more elastic, either the consolidation is tax 
or expenditure-based. Plus, when discrimination is low, the impact of tax-based consolidations 
is more pronounced for both genders. By using unemployment rate alternatively to employment 
rate, we are able to access the impacts of expenditure-based consolidations when discrimination 
is high. We find that females abandon more the market when submitted to high discrimination, 
as gender inequality boosts their burden of home chores.  
 Finally, whatever the discrimination level considered, the response of male’s 
employment to expenditure-based adjustments is always more expansionary than females’ one, 
mainly due to the role women undertake as expenditure substitutes. The different impacts across 
gender are mainly driven by movements in the industrial sector. In economies with high gender 
inequalities, tax-based consolidations are less recessionary to employment and expenditure-
based adjustments are less expansionary than in a more egalitarian world. 
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Exhibit 1 – List of countries included in the initial sample.  
Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Aruba, Australia, Austria, 
Azerbaijan, The Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan Bolivia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, 
Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Republic of 
Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, The 
Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hong 
Kong SAR, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, 
Kiribati, Korea, Kosovo, Kuwait, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao P.D.R., Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Macao SAR, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, 
Mexico, Micronesia, Moldova, Mongolia, Rep. of Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, North Macedonia, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New 
Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Puerto Rico, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, San Marino, Saudi 
Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, South Sudan, 
Spain, Sri Lanka, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, 
São Tomé and Príncipe, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, 
Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Vietnam, 
Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
 
